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and  
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Overview 
 
 
Since we last reported in October there has 
been a considerable deterioration in the 
actual and forecast performance of all the 
major economies. In October we considered 
there was a ‘high probability’ that Scotland 
would go into recession in 2009. Now, we 
are certain that not only is Scotland currently 
in recession but that the recession looks 
likely to be as severe as that in the 1980s 
and could even be worse. The tentacles of 
recession are spreading throughout the 
economy with construction and financial 
service activity subject to sustained 
contraction, hotels & catering turning down 
from the first quarter of last year and real 
estate & business services contracting 
appreciably after March. Economy-wide 
GVA contracted by -0.8% in the third quarter 
and seems likely to have fallen markedly in 
the fourth quarter if the UK’s performance is 
any guide. Third-quarter manufactured 
exports decreased by 1% in real terms and 
by 0.4% over the year. Business surveys 
covering the fourth quarter period reinforce 
the expectation that the slowdown will be 
severe. In the labour market employment is 
falling and unemployment is rising. 
 
We are in the midst of a deepening world 
recession driven by significant falls in 
aggregate demand, as the effect of bursting 
asset prices bubbles in property and shares 
leads households to scale back demand. 
High levels of household and corporate debt 
are also influencing the scale of the cut back 
in aggregate demand. With world demand 
generally contracting the principal exporting 
countries are likely to be disproportionately 
hit, other things equal. Conversely, those 
countries with a productive structure where 
exports count for disproportionately less e.g. 
the US, and where the public sector is 
disproportionately bigger, might be 
expected, other things equal, to do less 
badly in the recession. France offers a 
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possible example on both criteria. In these 
circumstances the impact of the recession 
on the UK and Scotland will not be the worst 
in the world as some have predicted. 
 
The banking crisis and the apparent freezing 
of the credit supply function are secondary 
to the fall in aggregate demand. However, 
one should not minimise their importance. 
Lending has clearly dropped considerably, 
in part because individual countries have 
lost the lending previously provided by 
foreign banks. In the UK this amounted to 
about 30 percent of overall lending. Lending 
by UK banks has also declined as they seek 
to rebuild their balance sheets. The drop in 
the supply of credit has clearly accelerated 
the downturn in GDP as any monetary 
buffer that might have been available to 
provide working capital to help companies 
adjust more slowly to the downturn in 
demand has been removed. It remains to be 
seen how quickly the UK government’s 
injection of capital into many of the key 
British banks, the introduction of its loan 
guarantee or insurance scheme, and the 
lower interest rates and quantitative easing 
effected by the Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy Committee, mitigate the scale and 
duration of the recession. It is clearly the 
case that in the face of severe restrictions 
on the supply of credit any recovery in 
demand and GDP growth will be more 
difficult to engineer. 
 
The developing scale of the global downturn 
suggests that the US fiscal package is 
unlikely to compensate for the depressing 
effect on world trade of the US recession, 
although it may mitigate it, and will not be 
sufficient to substitute for inadequate 
demand stimulus policies in the surplus 
countries. As world demand contracts there 
are rising protectionist fears and a clear 
need to develop a better global governance 
of the financial system. The UK fiscal 
injection appears to be too little too late, and 
relatively small compared to the US stimulus 
package. A case can be made for a further 
fiscal stimulus, although rising public sector 
debt and foreign exchange market pressure 
on sterling may limit the government’s 
options. The significant loosening of 
monetary policy in the UK, which is 
continuing, appears to be thwarted by a 
‘liquidity trap’ as asset prices fall and 
economic agents seek to hold cash rather 
than invest or spend. The case for 
temporary bank nationalisation in the UK 
and the creation of a ‘bad bank’ for toxic 
assets appears to grow stronger as the only 
effective means of unfreezing lending. 
 
With macroeconomic policy powers 
reserved to Westminster the Scottish 
economy will benefit from the UK fiscal 
injection. Yet, while the Scottish government 
action will contribute little to aggregate 
demand it can play a constructive role in 
helping the economy adjust to the 
consequences of the recession and 
mitigating the effects on long-term growth. 
 
Against this background we have prepared 
new forecasts that significantly revise 
downwards our expectation for Scottish 
growth over the next three years. Again 
because of the heightened levels of 
uncertainty we present a range of forecasts. 
On this occasion, a central forecast, which is 
bracketed by ‘optimistic’ and ‘worst’ 
projections.  
 
On our central case we predict that GVA will 
fall by around -2.6% this year and by -1.2% 
next year. Recovery does not begin to get 
underway until 2011 and remains below 
trend in 2012. Employment is forecast to 
decline by 14,200 in 2008, by 94,200 in 
2009 and by 51,400 in 2010, a total net job 
loss of nearly 160,000 over the three years. 
Unemployment rises from 137,000 in 2008 
to a peak of around 210,000 in 2010. 
 
GDP performance in third quarter 2008 
The latest official government outturn data for the Scottish 
economy refer to the third quarter 2008. Total Scottish 
gross value added at real basic prices fell by -0.8% in the 
quarter but rose by 1.4% over the year. The deterioration 
was worse in Scotland than in the UK – see Figure 1 - with 
UK GVA contracting by -0.6% in the quarter, while output 
over the year rose by 1.9%.  
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Service sector growth was appreciably weaker in Scotland 
during the quarter with an outturn of -1.1% here compared 
to -0.5% in the UK – see Figure 2. Over the year, Scottish 
services grew by 2%, while UK services expanded by 
2.4%.  
 
Within Scottish services the sector contributing most to the 
weak performance of Scottish services during the quarter 
was real estate and business services (REBS), which 
accounts for 18% of overall Scottish GVA compared to 
23% in the UK. REBS contracted by -3.7% in the quarter 
compared to a much smaller fall of -1.2% in the UK. GVA in 
Scottish REBS has been declining from the first quarter of 
last year – see Figure 6 – while UK REBS began to 
contract only in the third quarter. It is difficult to understand 
precisely why the downturn is more severe in the Scottish 
part of the sector. Real estate and property related services 
account for a 45% share of Scottish REBS, so there may 
be a property market link to the weaker performance of 
REBS. But the difficulty with this view is that the scale of 
the downturn in the housing market is greater in the UK 
overall, although that may not be the case in commercial 
property. Pure professional & business services make up a 
13% share of REBS and they may be contracting more 
rapidly in Scotland because of banking and financial 
service linkages and the weaker performance of that sector 
in Scotland – see Figure 5. 
 
Elsewhere in services, the retail & wholesale sector 
contracted in both Scotland and the UK during the quarter, 
by -1.5% and -2.7% respectively. But the additional data 
produced by the Scottish government indicating that it was 
wholesaling and not retailing that weakened in Scotland. 
Scottish Retail GVA rose by 1.9% in the quarter and by 
3.1% over the year. Financial services while weaker in 
Scotland grew by 0.5% in the quarter compared to growth 
of 1.1% in the UK. Figure 5 suggests that Scottish financial 
services has consistently underperformed UK financial 
services since the second quarter of 2006, with the 
exception of the fourth quarter 2006 and fourth quarter 
2007. We only have Scottish data for GVA growth in 
banking and this series indicates a fall of -1.9% in the third 
quarter of 2008. Other weaker Scottish service sectors in 
the third quarter included the public sector, which grew by 
0.1% here compared to an increase of 0.5% in the UK. 
Other services contracted by -1% compared to growth of 
0.8% in the UK, while hotels & catering cut back GVA 
slightly by -0.1% compared to growth of 0.3% in the UK. 
The only service sector, apart from retail and wholesaling, 
which out performed its UK counterpart was transport & 
communication which grew slightly by 0.1% compared to a 
small fall of -0.1% in the UK. 
 
Manufacturing in Scotland contracted by -0.6% in the third 
quarter, a smaller contraction than in UK manufacturing, 
which cut back output by -1.6% - see Figure 3. Over the 
year, GVA in Scottish manufacturing rose by 1.9% whereas 
UK manufacturing output fell by -0.5%. 
 
Within manufacturing, the relatively stronger Scottish 
performance in the third quarter was essentially driven by 
chemicals, - accounting for 10% of manufacturing GVA - 
which grew by a staggering 9.5% in the quarter, while UK 
chemicals expanded by only 0.5%. Such a large change 
suggests a one-off adjustment of some description and is, 
therefore, unlikely to be sustained.  Refined petroleum 
products also turned in a very strong growth performance 
in Scotland compared to the UK, expanding by 6.8% while 
its UK counterpart contracted by -2.9%; however, the 
sector accounts for only 1.4% of Scottish manufacturing 
GVA. Most other principal manufacturing sectors displayed 
weak or negative growth in Scotland during the third 
quarter. The food industry grew by 0.3% here compared to 
0.1% in the UK. The drinks sector experienced a fall in 
GVA of -0.7% in Scotland but registered a fall of -1.5% in 
the UK. Engineering overall contracted markedly both in 
Scotland and the UK by -2.3% and -2.5% respectively. 
Within engineering, the electronics sector cut back 
considerably in Scotland with GVA falling by -4.6%, while 
its UK counterpart registered a lesser but still marked fall of 
-2.9%. In contrast, both mechanical engineering and 
transport equipment grew by 0.1% and 0.4% in Scotland 
while contracting by -1.3% and -3.1%, respectively, in the 
UK. Finally, paper, printing & publishing and other 
manufacturing cut back production appreciably with the 
former contracting by -2.1% and the latter by -4.9%. The 
comparable UK figures were -2.1% and -2.8%. 
 
Despite the relative buoyancy of the housing market in 
Scotland, the construction sector in Scotland has 
effectively been in recession for some time – see Figure 4. 
This clearly reflects a drop-off in demand for major project 
activity from both the public and commercial property 
sectors. GVA fell by -1% in Scottish construction inn the 
quarter, while UK construction activity dropped by -0.2%. 
GVA in Scottish construction has now dropped by more 
than 6% since its peak in the forth quarter of 2006. 
 
Figure 6 brings together the GVA indexes for 10 key 
sectors that are, or have been, significant for the growth of 
the Scottish economy. The figure reveals the continuing 
strength in chemicals and transport & communication 
services, the weakness in financial services, electronics, 
and deterioration in REBS and hotels & catering. 
 
Figure 7 provides a clearer picture of how the downturn is 
affecting the Scottish economy. It does so by charting the 
scale of the decline in sectoral GVA from the last peak in 
GVA in the sector. Clearly, we can’t be certain whether the 
peaks identified actually do represent a cyclical peak and 
so the analysis could change once later data become 
available. It is appears to be the case that the downturn 
started in construction from 2006q3, which by 2008q3 had 
lost -6.3% of GVA in the sector. Financial services began 
to turn down two quarters later in 2007q1 and then 
contracted more sharply, with GVA falling by -8.5% by 
2008q3. In the next quarter 2007q2 mining & quarrying 
started to turn down and by 2008q3 it had lost -2.5% of its 
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GVA. Of course, whether the downturn in mining & 
quarrying is related to wider forces promoting the recession 
in Scotland is a moot point and could well be unrelated. 
From the fourth quarter of 2007 electronics started to turn 
down suggesting perhaps that export demand for 
manufactures was starting to be affected by falling demand 
conditions across the globe. Then from the first quarter of 
last year hotels & catering and REBS registered falling 
output. The former will clearly have been affected by both 
slowing domestic demand and the effect on tourism of 
falling foreign as well as domestic demand. We discussed 
above some of the likely drivers of the downturn in REBS. 
 
Recession issues and policy responses 
 
What is driving the recession? 
There is now much agreement that the ultimate cause of 
the global slowdown lies in the large financial imbalances 
in the world economy that built up over the past decade. 
Burgeoning current account surpluses from mid to late 
1990s in China, other emerging market economies, oil 
exporting economies, Germany and Japan, led to 
significant flows of surplus savings mainly to the United 
States (70%), a little to the UK and an array of smaller 
economies such as Spain, Ireland and Iceland. These 
surplus savings served to lower long-term real and nominal 
interest rates across the world economy and fostered a 
boom in credit aided by the financial de-regulation that 
occurred in the US, UK and elsewhere in the early 1980s. 
 
The boom in credit growth facilitated higher personal 
consumption and spending on a range of perceived high 
yielding assets, with associated growth in investment 
banking activities, hedge funds and private equity funds 
across the globe. Asset price bubbles began to emerge 
especially in housing and property markets in US, UK and 
some other European countries. The bubbles burst in 
2007, as the US fed funds rate rose some 4 percentage 
points to 5.25% between 2004 and 2006, and the extent of 
credit excess began to be evident, e.g. failed repayments 
and foreclosures in US sub-prime mortgage market. 
Banking losses were initially triggered by the defaults on 
sub-prime-mortgages. But such losses were then 
magnified dramatically throughout the banking and 
financial system on a global scale due to the creation and 
rapid growth of complex financial instruments that were 
perceived to diversify risk and returns. Examples of such 
instruments include mortgage backed securities such as 
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) based on all types of assets 
including mortgages, and credit derivatives, especially the 
credit default swap (CDS), a way of insuring against losses 
on a loan portfolio, CDOs of CDOs and synthetic CDOs. 
 
The complexity of these instruments meant that the losses 
generated by the deflation of house prices, commercial 
property prices, other asset prices, and associated loan re-
payment defaults, could not easily be gauged or located. 
Banks began to lose trust in one another and inter-bank 
lending rates rose. Then, to dramatise the narrative, the 
major US and world investment bank Lehman Brother was 
allowed to go into administration by the US government on 
15
th
 September 2008. This sent a signal round the financial 
world that insolvent banks would not necessarily be bailed-
out by governments, so inter-bank lending largely ceased 
and the wholesale money markets effectively froze.  The 
consequent loss of confidence and trust in the banking and 
other parts of financial system led to a breakdown in the 
credit supply mechanism within and outside the system - 
the so-called “credit crunch”. The scale of the losses also 
meant that banks had to restructure their balance sheets 
resulting in loans being called in, overdrafts reduced, 
reduced possibilities for re-financing of corporate loans, 
and a general cut back in lending, further exacerbating the 
credit crunch. 
 
There would appear to be some uncertainty about the 
specific drivers of the current downturn and hence the 
predicted consequences for national economies. There is a 
body of opinion that sees the bursting of the housing 
market bubble in the US, the extensive defaults on ‘sub-
prime’ mortgages, the subsequent banking losses and 
insolvencies as locating the main incidence of the global 
downturn in those countries, such as the US and the UK, 
with previously highly buoyant housing markets, significant 
household borrowings and large banking and financial 
sectors. Hence, the OECD and the IMF and others have 
forecast that the UK will be one of the countries most 
affected by the downturn. 
 
We take a somewhat different view and do not necessarily 
accept that the UK and Scotland will be the worst affected 
in terms of the size of the GDP contraction, although the 
downturn will be sizable here and perhaps unprecedented. 
 
The first point to note, perhaps obviously, is that it is falling 
aggregate demand that is driving the contraction of GDP. 
Secondly, the banking crisis and the apparent freezing of 
the credit supply function are secondary to the fall in 
aggregate demand. However, one should not minimise 
their importance. Lending has clearly dropped 
considerably, in part because individual countries have lost 
the lending previously provided by foreign banks. In the UK 
this amounted to about 30 percent of overall lending. 
Lending by UK banks has also declined as they seek to 
rebuild their balance sheets. The drop in the supply of 
credit has clearly accelerated the downturn in GDP as any 
monetary buffer that might have been available to provide 
working capital to help companies adjust more slowly to the 
downturn in demand has been removed. It remains to be 
seen how quickly the UK government’s injection of capital 
into many of the key British banks, the introduction of its 
loan guarantee or insurance scheme, and the lower 
interest rates and quantitative easing effected by the Bank 
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, mitigate the 
scale and duration of the recession. It is clearly the case 
that in the face of severe restrictions on the supply of credit 
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any recovery in demand and GDP growth will be more 
difficult to engineer. 
 
Thirdly, as Martin Wolf notes
1 
drawing on work by Richard 
Koo
2
 on the Japanese deflation in the 1990s, falling asset 
prices will have a greater impact on demand the more 
assets have been funded by debt. This is because the 
evidence from Japan suggests that as asset prices fall 
borrowers will seek to pay down their debts so increasing 
saving and reducing consumption by more than would be 
the case from a simple wealth effect of the falling asset 
price. If this analysis is correct then significant falls in asset 
prices after a major credit boom and debt inflation are likely 
to precipitate large falls in aggregate demand. Moreover, 
the UK and the US where levels of household borrowing 
are high should, other things equal, experience a 
disproportionate drop in demand compared to those 
countries where household borrowing is lower even if asset 
prices have fallen similarly. And some asset prices such as 
those for houses and commercial property are likely to fall 
further in the US and UK. Added to this, the relatively 
greater size of the banking and financial sectors in the UK 
and US and the scale of the insolvency present in such 
banks offers a further reason, both in terms of direct 
demand reduction and restricted credit supply, why the UK 
and the US might suffer a more severe downturn.  
 
So, the analysis so far might appear to suggest that the US 
and the UK are likely to experience a more deep and 
prolonged recession than other principal economies. But 
there is another issue that needs to be considered. 
 
Fourthly, the downturn in aggregate demand is clearly 
worldwide, even though the incidence might vary inter alia 
according to the extent that asset price falls and household 
and corporate debt vary across countries. The worldwide 
contraction in demand is not of course confined to demand 
for domestic goods and services. Demand for imports is 
much affected and growing protectionist tendencies, 
including attempts to encourage domestic banks to lend 
locally rather than abroad, may serve to worsen the 
deterioration in import demand.  However, import demand 
is not met evenly from the world economy. Countries such 
as Germany, Japan, China, and export ‘platforms’ such as 
Taiwan, Ireland and Singapore that serve world trade 
disproportionately through their export activity are likely to 
experience a sizable contraction in the demand for their 
goods and services. A simple numerical example should 
make the point. Suppose there are ten, equal-sized 
countries and each experience an initial drop in domestic 
demand of 5 percent. Now assume that in nine of those 
countries the drop in import demand amounts to a fifth or 1 
percent point of the drop in domestic demand and they all 
import from the tenth country, which imports nothing. GDP 
falls by 4 percent in the nine but by 14 percent in the tenth 
country. 
 
The conclusion is that with world demand generally 
contracting the principal exporting countries are likely to be 
disproportionately hit, other things equal. Conversely, those 
countries with a productive structure where exports count 
for disproportionately less e.g. the US, and where the 
public sector is disproportionately bigger, might be 
expected, other things equal, to do less badly in the 
recession. France offers a possible example on both 
criteria. 
 
The latest GDP growth figures for the fourth quarter of 
2008 appear both to offer some support for this contention 
and to underline the seriousness of the crisis. In Japan 
GDP fell by -3.3% in the quarter, in Germany GDP 
contracted by -2.1% in the quarter, in Italy the decline was -
1.8%, while in the UK the fall was -1.5% the same rate of 
contraction as euro area (EA15) and the EU27. At the 
same time the US economy contracted by 1%, and French 
GDP fell by -1.2%. Even the Chinese economy, for so 
many years a key engine of global growth, slowed to 6.8%, 
at an annualised rate, in the fourth quarter, from an 
annualised rate of 9% in the third quarter and growth of 
13% in 2007 as a whole. Chinese GDP growth over the 
year to the fourth quarter was 9%, the lowest rate since 
2001, when an annual rate of 8.3 percent was registered, 
and it was the first time China's growth fell into the single 
figures since 2003. 
 
Policy responses 
We consider successively issues for global, UK and 
Scottish policy responses to the recession. 
 
Global 
It might appear to be a truism to suggest that the global 
nature of the downturn requires a global solution. However, 
there is a danger that some countries while acknowledging 
the global nature of the recession may seek to pass 
responsibility for dealing with it to other countries and/or 
international bodies such as the IMF. Countries such as 
China, Germany, Japan that have tended to produce much 
more than their domestic demand, so running significant 
savings surpluses and current account surpluses, will find it 
easy to blame countries such as the US, UK and Spain 
where domestic demand has far outrun supply. If such 
feelings translate into a policy stance in Germany, China 
and Japan that refuses to recognise their own obligation to 
take responsibility for maintaining global aggregate 
demand by expanding their own domestic demand, then 
the world economy will in all likelihood experience a 
depression. It is, in any event, in the direct interest of these 
countries to avoid a significant contraction in world supply 
because they will bear the brunt of it as the drop in world 
trade disproportionately reduces demand for their exports
3
  
 
The $800 billion fiscal stimulation package that is being 
introduced by the new Obama administration in the US is a 
welcome development notwithstanding the flaws in the 
package. While this package – equivalent to about 5% of 
US GDP - may help to promote confidence in the world 
economy generally its effect on world trade flows will be 
limited. A rough calculation suggests that if the stimulus 
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package raises US aggregate demand by an equal amount 
– unlikely given that there will be some flow into savings 
and taxes - US imports will expand by around 14% of the 
GDP expansion and given the level of world exports  - 
$16.34 trillion according to the CIA World Factbook - the 
stimulus to world exports will be less than one percent. 
However, before the stimulus package was enacted the US 
Congressional Budget Office was forecasting that US GDP 
would fall by 7% over the next two years. So, the package 
is unlikely to compensate for the depressing effect on world 
trade of the US recession, although it may mitigate it, and 
will not be sufficient to substitute for inadequate demand 
stimulus policies in the surplus countries. Moreover, in the 
medium to longer-term the post-recessionary equilibrium in 
the US will require reduced fiscal and current account 
deficits, which implies that the US demand for world 
exports must fall.  
 
There is of course also the fear that surplus countries may 
be tempted to protect their market share by adopting 
increasingly protectionist measures such as subsidising 
domestic industry. This is already beginning to happen in 
deficit countries such as the US and UK e.g. the auto 
industry, in response to the initial drop in domestic demand 
due to the asset price deflation that accompanied the credit 
crunch. Financial protectionism is also on the increase as 
governments seek to encourage domestic banks to focus 
their lending on the domestic economy. Retaliation by both 
surplus and deficit countries will eventually serve to destroy 
world supply capacity in the medium to long-term even if 
there are short-term domestic supply benefits. A more 
prolonged recession and slower long-term growth is the 
likely result. 
 
Finally, looking to the longer term, the governance of the 
global financial system must change. Specifically, the 
system must be able to facilitate the channelling of surplus 
savings into investment opportunities in emerging countries 
rather than fund debt expansion in the advanced countries 
such as the US and UK. The IMF needs to become more 
responsive to the needs of emerging country borrowers 
and help provide more effective insurance against systemic 
risks than at present.
4
 
 
 
The United Kingdom 
In the November 2008 Pre-Budget Report (PBR) the 
government introduced a fiscal stimulus in an attempt to 
counter the recession, which amounts to a  £25 billion 
injection of demand over the two fiscal years 2009 -10 and 
2010 –11. A £12.5 billion temporary – for one year – VAT 
cut and proposals to bring forward capital spending mean, 
according to the IFS Green Budget, that government 
borrowing will rise by £9.3 billion this year and £16.3 billion 
next year. This therefore amounts to an injection of 
additional demand equivalent to roughly 0.6% of GDP this 
year and 1.1% of GDP next year. The fiscal injection 
should be viewed in the context of a developing consensus 
that GDP may contract by -3% or more this year – in 
February a consensus of new forecasts averaging -2.8% 
for 2009 - and by low or zero growth in 2010 – new 
forecast consensus in February of 0.5%.
5
 Against this 
background the fiscal injection looks like too little too late, 
and relatively small compared to the US stimulus package. 
It is also assumed that the injection will actually raise 
aggregate demand as hoped for by the government. It may 
not do so, of course, if households fully anticipate that they 
will have to pay higher taxes and experience lower public 
spending in order to fund the current stimulus.
6
 
 
We contend that there is a case for the government to go 
further and introduce a new fiscal stimulus, front ended as 
far as is feasible on the 2009-10 fiscal year. The orders of 
magnitude required are for about a further £20 billion for 
the two fiscal years 2009-10 and 2010-11, with reversal of 
the overall £45 billion injection progressively after that to 
restore the public finances. This would amount to an 
approx stimulus to aggregate demand of 3%, which would, 
therefore, be closer to the anticipated decline in GDP over 
the two years and a little closer to the relative scale of the 
US fiscal stimulus package. 
 
The deteriorating state of the UK’s public finances and the 
rising yield on 10-year government bonds – now at 3.41%, 
40 basis points above 10-year German government bonds 
– suggests that a further fiscal stimulus could be 
destabilising. Moreover, the greater the delay the greater 
the risk that the stimulus will become irrelevant while the 
risk of a loss of confidence in sterling in the foreign 
exchange markets and the threat of future inflation will 
weigh more heavily. All of these factors need to be 
weighed carefully but in our view the most pressing need is 
for further injections of aggregate demand from the public 
sector to offset the apparent continuing and perhaps 
worsening downward spiral in private sector demand 
across the global economy. 
 
Since we last reported in October 2008 the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England (BOE) has 
cut bank rate from 5% to 1%. There is an expectation that 
interest rates will fall further to zero. With interest rates 
close to zero and prices rises turning negative, real interest 
rates will effectively be increasing and expectations will 
generally be for nominal interest rates to rise
7
. The 
expectation will also be for bond prices to fall. There will be 
no incentive to hold monetary assets that are falling in 
value for speculative/investment purposes and so 
economic agents will seek to hold cash – a ‘liquidity trap’. 
In such circumstances a policy of boosting liquidity and 
interest rate cuts will fail to influence the real economy. 
There is evidence that this is happening in the UK with 
narrow measures of the money supply showing some 
growth following the efforts of the BOE to raise liquidity. But 
this does not appear to be passing through into lending and 
growth in the broader money supply. For example, non-
seasonally adjusted M4 lending – which includes private 
sector bank and building society deposits – fell by -0.1% 
and -0.3% in November and December respectively. It is in 
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this context that the BOE is expected to seek to expand the 
money supply by directly buying up public and private 
assets – so-called ‘quantitative easing – and so bypass the 
banking system. 
 
It is also in this context that calls for the government to 
temporarily nationalise the main UK banks should be 
viewed with increasing sympathy. There may also be a 
further case for the removal of the toxic assets currently 
residing in these banks and their placement in a ’bad bank’, 
where they can be priced and subsequently sold off when 
market conditions allow. The UK government has already 
done much. New capital has been brought into the main 
banks – with the exception of Barclays and HSBC – in two 
successive tranches of £37 billion and £20 billion. Loan 
guarantees representing contingent liabilities of up to £600 
billion have also been given. But there is a view 
increasingly gaining acceptance that the government 
should go further and nationalise the key banks, all be it 
temporarily. 
 
The case for temporary nationalisation rests on four 
propositions: 
 
 There is a positive externality to the wider 
economy from increased bank lending. The profit 
maximising objectives of shareholders require 
balance street restructuring and reduced lending 
risk. Banks are withdrawing loans and are 
applying tighter lending conditions to new lending. 
The existence of a non-priced externality offers a 
classic example of market failure and prima facie 
justification for government intervention. The 
government’s majority shareholding does not 
appear to be changing current bank behaviour in 
the interests of the minority private shareholders 
and so temporary nationalisation may be justified. 
 
 Despite falls in the inter-bank lending rates, there 
is still uncertainty about whether British banks are 
insolvent. This uncertainty and lack of trust will 
continue until toxic assets are taken out of the 
banks. 
 
 Relatedly, issues of capital adequacy of the banks 
seem likely to continue as long as they remain 
outside complete government ownership. 
 
 The need to focus on more traditional forms of 
lower return/less risk banking may be opposed by 
existing private shareholders. 
 
The case against nationalisation appears to offer the 
following key points: 
 
 There would be a significant further rise in public 
debt, which might encourage a loss of confidence 
in the UK’s credit rating, damage sterling and 
even the City of London’s reputation. 
 Private sector banks not taken into public 
ownership may be ‘crowded out’ by what is in 
effect a government subsidy. 
 
 A so-called ‘temporary’ nationalisation may be 
difficult to unravel. 
 
 Non-market considerations may begin to 
dominate the behaviour of the banks as politicians 
interfere to put social objectives, even short-term 
political objectives, above corporate efficiency and 
private shareholder returns. 
 
We recognise the case against but, on balance, believe 
that current circumstances give greater weight to the case 
for a temporary nationalisation of the main British banks. 
 
 
Scotland 
In considering policy issues for the Scottish government it 
is useful to distinguish between: 
 
 policies to counteract the recession, and 
 policies to deal with the consequences of 
recession 
 
Counteracting the recession 
While the Scottish government has little power to influence 
aggregate demand in the short-term in the Scottish 
economy, it should be remembered that the current 
constitutional settlement reserves macro-economic 
stabilisation to Westminster. The Scottish economy should 
benefit from the £25 billion UK fiscal injection introduced in 
November’s PBR by a direct boost to demand of up to 2% 
of GDP. A significant injection. But leakages from a small 
open economy are greater than from a larger economy and 
so both the direct and indirect stimulus to demand will be 
less. 
 
The Scottish Government has introduced a six-point 
stimulus plan: bringing forward some capital expenditure 
e.g. investment in affordable housing; enhanced support 
for tourism promotion; speeding up the planning process; 
increased support for energy efficiency; increased advice 
to businesses and individuals; and improved financial 
advice to vulnerable individuals. The package will bring a 
very small stimulus to aggregate demand in 2009 and 2010 
as some expenditures are brought forward but the overall 
macro effect will negligible. Nevertheless, taken together 
with the UK government fiscal stimulus and the significant 
monetary easing introduced by the MPC the package is 
valuable. The information and advice elements of the 
package may offer some market adjustment assistance 
and some mitigation of recession effects. 
 
There are other possibilities and imperatives for the 
Scottish government in seeking to counteract the 
recession.  The Scottish construction industry was first into 
recession and as noted above has been languishing for 
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some time. The government needs to consider not just how 
much public investment can be brought forward within the 
budget. The government has been criticised by opposition 
parties for the delays to public investment allegedly caused 
by the development and introduction of the Scottish 
Futures Trust to replace Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). But in current recessionary circumstances PPPs 
will find it difficult to proceed given the difficulties of raising 
private finance. In such conditions there may be a case for 
bringing forward conventional procurement projects and 
temporarily delaying any planned PPPs, although 
conventional procurement raises its own financing issues.  
 
Further support for the construction industry might be 
possible if the government was willing to consider making 
advance payments to contracted companies that may be 
experiencing financial constraints, such as those 
undertaking government construction work.  
 
Other actions to ease credit difficulties that the Scottish 
government could consider include, directly encouraging 
banks in Scotland to lend. The Scottish government will be 
a very large customer of the banks. It could seek to make 
its banking contracts conditional on a more pro-active 
stance on lending by the banks in Scotland.  It could further 
ensure that the rule of ten-day payments of invoices to 
suppliers was adhered to in order to assist small firms. 
 
Finally, perhaps more could be done to assist the labour 
market to more flexibly adjust to the recession by: 
encouraging the further and higher education sector to 
provide short-term but intense training courses for those 
coming on to unemployment register; and assisting 
redundant workers in starting their own firms (see below). 
 
Dealing with the consequences of recession 
The policy objective here should be to try and ensure that 
the recession does not damage the long-term trend of 
Scottish growth. Further, there is the question whether the 
recession might provide an opportunity to raise the trend in 
Scottish GDP growth? We plan to deal with the question 
what post-recession Scottish economy might look like and 
related policy issues in a later edition of the Commentary. 
We confine ourselves to a few observations here. 
 
The government should through Scottish Enterprise and 
related agencies seek to minimise the impact of the 
recession on the Scottish growth trend. Existing investment 
funds such as the Seed Fund, Co-investment Fund and 
Venture Fund should be examined to see if they can play a 
role in overcoming key firms’ cash flow and liquidity 
problems due to credit constraints associated with the 
current recession. A debate should be encouraged on how 
Scottish Development International might deal with the 
expected decline in inward investment through the 
recession e.g. Increased marketing? Increased corporate 
targeting? Greater flexibility in provision of Regional 
Selective Assistance? 
 
It might seem fanciful but the recession could offer 
possibilities for raising the trend rate of growth of the 
Scottish economy. We know R&D and innovation are 
critical to growth but there is also evidence that companies 
that raised their R&D spend during a recession improved 
their subsequent competitive position. A US study of a 
large sample of firms over 20 years, which included the 
1990-91 recession, found that many industry leaders at 
end of period were those increasing their R&D during 
recession.
8
There is clear need for the government and its 
agencies to publicise this message and examine what 
public policy in Scotland can do encourage R&D at a time 
when many firms will be under pressure to cut back on 
R&D outlays. 
 
Research also suggests that in a recession many 
unemployed workers will wish to start their own firms. The 
Enterprise Allowance scheme in the 1980s was introduced 
to help workers made redundant in the early 1980s 
recession start their own firms. This was superseded by a 
shift away from start-up support as an unemployment 
measure. But there may now be a case for policymakers in 
Scotland to examine the possibility of using existing 
business birth rate support policies to target the newly 
redundant who may be encouraged to start their own firm. 
 
 
Forecasts 
Since we last reported in October there has been a 
considerable deterioration in the actual and forecast 
performance of all the major economies. In October we 
considered there was a ‘high probability’ that Scotland 
would go into recession in 2009. Now, we are certain that 
not only is Scotland currently in recession but that the 
recession looks likely to be as severe as that in the 1980s 
and could even be worse. The tentacles of recession are 
spreading throughout the economy with construction and 
financial service activity subject to sustained contraction, 
hotels & catering turning down from the first quarter of last 
year and real estate & business services contracting 
appreciably after March. Economy-wide GVA contracted by 
-0.8% in the third quarter and seems likely to have fallen 
markedly in the fourth quarter if the UK’s performance is 
any guide. Third-quarter manufactured exports decreased 
by 1% in real terms and by 0.4% over the year. Business 
surveys covering the fourth quarter period reinforce the 
expectation that the slowdown will be severe. 
 
In the Scottish labour market net job creation is falling and 
unemployment is rising – see Labour Market Issues section 
of this Commentary. In the final three months of 2008, 
employment fell by 0.2% to 2.53 million, while 
unemployment, on the preferred ILO measure rose by 
9.2% to 137,000. The rate of increase in unemployment 
was faster than in the UK but at 5.1% of the labour force 
the level of unemployment remains below the UK rate of 
6.3%. 
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Table 1:  Forecast Scottish GVA growth in three scenarios, 2008-2012  
 
 
GVA 
Growth (% 
per annum) 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
      
Optimistic 0.65 -1.90 -0.43 1.08 1.73 
      
Central 0.59 -2.57 -1.21 0.52 1.14 
      
Worse 0.51 -3.07 -1.65 -0.13 0.55 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Forecast Scottish net jobs growth in three scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
 
Net job 
no’s 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
      
Optimistic -14,200 -73,007 -42,400 7,923 25,089 
      
Central -14,200 -94,179 -51,440 3,037 14,476 
      
Worse -14,200 -108,984 -63,064 -6,639 10,734 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Forecast Scottish ILO unemployment in three scenarios, 2008-2 
 
ILO 16+ 
no’s and 
rate% 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
      
Optimistic 137.2 173.3 194.5 191.0 176.3 
 5.1 6.5 7.3 7.2 6.6 
Central 137.2 184.4 209.9 207.4 199.9 
 5.1 6.9 7.9 7.8 7.5 
Worse 137.2 191.6 223.1 226.1 220.4 
 5.1 7.2 8.4 8.5 8.3 
 
 
Against this background we have prepared new forecasts 
that significantly revise downwards our expectation for 
Scottish growth over the next three years. Again because 
of the heightened levels of uncertainty we present a range 
of forecasts. On this occasion, a central forecast, which is 
bracketed by ‘optimistic’ and ‘worst’ projections. These 
forecasts and the underlying scenarios are discussed in 
detail in the Commentary section: Forecasts of the Scottish 
Economy. 
 
GVA 
On our central case we predict that GVA will fall by around 
-2.6% this year and by -1.2% next year – see Table 1. 
Recovery does not begin to get underway until 2011 and 
remains below trend in 2012. On the worst case the global 
recession and financial sclerosis continues well in to 2011 
and while there may be some recovery in the latter part of 
2011 growth remains weak and significantly below trend in 
2012. Only in the optimistic case does recession effectively  
end next year but with a weak then strengthening recovery 
in 2011 and 2012. 
 
In our central case projection, we now take the position that 
Scottish economy will perform a little stronger than 
expected UK growth. We take this view because the 
impacts of the systemic drop in global aggregate demand 
resulting from falling asset prices and financial sclerosis will 
be sufficient to outweigh specific sectoral outcomes such 
as the contraction of financial service and banking 
activities. Experience shows that the Scottish economy is 
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more robust than the UK to a sharp contraction in 
aggregate demand as we noted in the previous 
Commentary. In the circumstance of the causes of the 
present recession the factors of relevance include: the 
somewhat bigger public sector and higher degree of social 
security payments in Scotland, while lower asset ownership 
e.g. houses and shares, means less exposure to asset 
price bubbles and bursts. On the other hand, Scotland’s 
relatively higher export propensity may make Scotland a 
little more vulnerable to a drop in global demand. But 
overall, we now consider that the circumstances of the 
recession make it more likely than we previously thought 
that the Scottish economy will hold up relatively better than 
the UK. On our worst-case scenario this may not be the 
case. 
 
Employment 
Table 2 outlines our net job change projections on the 
three cases. In the central forecast employment is forecast 
to decline by 14,200 in 2008, by 94,200 in 2009 and by 
51,400 in 2010, a total net job loss of nearly 160,000 over 
the three years. This is bracketed by an anticipated net job 
loss of nearly 130,000 in the optimistic case and by 
186,000 in the worst case. To the worst case must be 
added a further 6,600 net job loss as the contraction in the 
labour market runs into 2011. 
 
It is worth pointing out, as the Labour Market Issues 
section of this Commentary indicates, that it remains 
unclear how the more flexible and deregulated labour 
market that has emerged over the past 25 years will impact 
on the level of jobs and the level of unemployment during 
the current recession. We note that there are strong signs 
that the downturn may affect more adversely those 
employed on more flexible employment terms, with 
companies and co-operating unions making much effort to 
retain key skills and expertise. 
 
Unemployment 
Table 3 presents a summary of our ILO unemployment 
forecasts under the three scenarios. With such significant 
job losses forecast then it is inevitable that forecast 
unemployment will rise appreciably. But the effect of job 
losses will not wholly be registered by a growth in 
measured unemployment. Some unemployed workers will 
leave the labour market either by ceasing to offer 
themselves for work, a drop in the activity rate, or by 
leaving the economy all together, migration. Our forecasts 
of unemployment reflect an average pass through from job 
loss to the measured increase in unemployment of around 
fifty per cent on average in any one year. On this basis 
unemployment in the central case rises from 137,000 in 
2008 to a peak of around 210,000 in 2010. On the worst 
case, unemployment peaks at 226,000 in 2011 and 
195,000 in 2010 in the optimistic case.  When expressed in 
rate terms these forecasts suggest that unemployment will 
rise to a 7.3% average in 2010 on the optimistic case, 7.9% 
in 2010 on the central case and 8.4% in 2010 and 8.5% in 
2011 on the worst-case scenario. It is worth stressing that 
unemployment is a lagging indicator of economic 
performance and continues to rise for some months, even 
quarters, after output has begun to recover. 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
23 February 2009 
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Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2008q3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q3 
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Figure 3: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q3 
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2008q3 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Scottish and UK Financial Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q3 
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Figure 6: Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2008q3 
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Figure 7: GVA percentage contraction to 2008q3 from latest peak by sector 
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